Because China is struggling with its own ally of North Korea

North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test way back on January 6 and the next day the US and China began negotiations on what to do about it. China is the only protector and ally of North Korea, so expectations were low.

But on Wednesday, two months later, the Security Council UN unanimously adopted a resolution drafted by the US and China, punish North Korea with some of the toughest sanctions in decades. Several North Korean officials are sanctioned, and all cargo inside and outside the country must be inspected, along with other measures.

So how big of a deal is this? China is in fact increasingly hard in, and less patient with North Korea. Their alliance is under some of the most cargo has experienced in years, and long-term trends suggest that the strain will only worsen. However, the fundamentals of the alliance remain in force.

As much as the US You may like to hope that there is a breakdown of North Korea and China comes - it would be a big problem, because China's support allows misbehaving North Korea - there is little reason to believe that this will happen. picture, do not expect the status quo to change.

Central China strategy that explains what's going on

All this makes much more sense if you know of ancient China policy toward North Korea, which, like many of the policies of the Chinese Communist Party, is often boiled for a very simple slogan.

In this case, only six words: "No war, no instability, No Nukes."

In other words, China has three main priorities of the Korean Peninsula, and those priorities to define everything. They are ranked in descending order, ie, that the top priority for China is to avoid war on the peninsula, its second priority is to prevent instability (eg, by a collapse of North Korea), and the third is to prevent nuclear weapons.

That helps explain why China is going to new lengths to punish North Korea for its nuclear test January (as well as a missile test February): You really want to deter North Korea from further nuclear development, which considers they bring risks that could hurt China as well.

But it also shows why we should not expect China to do anything as drastic as the abandonment of North Korea completely. China wants to preserve the stability and the status quo on the Korean peninsula, with a divided Korea and anti-Western North Korean reliably. These are the highest priorities to deter nuclear weapons from North Korea.

But there is still a real - if it is almost temporary insurance - breakdown in relations that led to these sanctions.

The strange story of how relations between China and North Korea broke

There is some evidence for a theory that the nuclear test North Korea itself was due, at least in part, by the rupture of relations with China - a failure that has culminated in China's support to UN sanctions the Wednesday.

And that the break may have been precipitated by, strange as it may seem, a major diplomatic incident involving an all-female pop band from North Korea. And goes back to when Kim Jong Un took power first.

After North Korean leader Kim Jong Il died in late 2011, and his son Kim Jong Un took over, China took what analysts call an approach of "wait and see" - seeing the young and inexperienced new leader before decide whether to support it.

In February 2013, Kim Jong Un was still consolidating power, North Korea conducted its third nuclear test. Kim may have felt the need to do this to prove himself to the military elite of their country. This angered China.

"The Chinese were upset with the North Koreans through much of their behavior, not least the third nuclear test [in 2013], and had reduced the amount of assistance they were giving North Korea," John Everard, the former British ambassador to North Korea, told the BBC in January.

"Through most of 2015, the North Korean relations with China - its only ally and main economic benefactor - were clearly frost," Everard said.

But gradually, China's anger cooled, and it seemed that Kim Jong Un had consolidated his rule. It was time to compensate. Thus, in October 2015, Beijing sent a gift of good will: Liu Yunshan became the first member of the board of supreme leadership of China, the Politburo Standing Committee, to visit North Korea since Kim took power .

That December, Kim sent a return gift. He announced the Moranbong Band, all-female pop band state of North Korea and Kim's pet project, go to China to perform a concert for Communist Party officials.

But on 10 December 2015, it is when it all fell apart. The day of the Moranbong Band arrived in Beijing, state media said North Korea announced that the country had developed its first hydrogen bomb.

Chinese leaders felt surprised, seeing it as a cynical ploy to corner to accept the ad. Senior Chinese leaders withdrew their assistance to Moranbong band shows, sending lower-level officials instead. The regime of Kim, insulted and furious, canceled shows up. The Moranbong band rushed into a flight home, which has not done.

A couple of weeks later, North Korea tested its fourth nuclear device, perhaps in a deliberate act of defiance against Beijing.

"Significantly, before the above tests, North Korea has told the Chinese who are about to test," said Everard. "On this occasion, the Chinese say, they did not."

The breakdown in relations was, if not the main driver of the nuclear test North Korea, then at least, apparently a significant precipitating factor as it left North Korea might feel less constrained by the wishes of China. The fact that North Korea has not given advance notice of Beijing for testing makes it difficult to deny both.

China is not the abandonment of North Korea

"For Beijing, the goal of sanctions is not a change of regime," Brookings Paul Park and Moon Katharine SA write. Sanctions this week "are not robust enough or specific enough to achieve regime change. If they were, China and Russia are not signed in."

The passage of poison between China and North Korea is likely to dissipate. North Korea has never been a particularly flexible and reliable ally for Beijing. There is no reason to believe that the calculation of China in supporting the regime has changed - and that may be part of the reason North Korea feels so free to challenge your sponsor and the only ally.

"China considers stability in the Korean peninsula as its main focus," Eleanor Albert and Beina Xu, the Council on Foreign Relations, writes in a good general information published last month. "Beijing has urged world powers not to push too hard Pyongyang for fear of precipitating a collapse of the regime."

This comes, most crucially, in the unequal trade that serves as a de facto subsidy Chinese North Korea:

Trade between China and North Korea has also steadily increased in recent years: in 2014 trade between the two countries reached $ 6.39 trillion, compared to about $ 500 million in 2000, according to figures from the Agency for Promotion of Seoul Korea Trade and Investment. Recent reports indicate that bilateral trade was reduced by almost 15 percent in 2015, although it is unclear whether the drop is the result of the chilled relations between Beijing and Pyongyang or economic slowdown in China. However, "there is no reason to think that political risks emanating from North Korea will lead China to withdraw its economic safety net for North Korea in the short term," writes CFR Senior Fellow Scott Snyder.

There's a real irony here. Because North Korea is consistent and predictable irresponsible, and because China is more sensitive to the risks incurred by the behavior of North Korea, ultimately, may be China, which works to improve relations.

"China's strategic interests in stability and denuclearization of the Korean peninsula will require Beijing to improve relations with Pyongyang to restore its influence," Snyder, the CFR fellow, has written.

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